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It is impossible to contemplate the fiftieth anniversary of Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination without hearing a whispered “if only.”
King, after all, was murdered just as he sought
to expand the Civil Rights Movement’s agenda
to include an explicit focus on promoting multiracial economic justice, a cause that has met
with little success in the intervening years. If
only he had survived, the whispered voice says,
he would have transformed the Movement into
a force that powerfully and effectively fought
for economic egalitarianism with the same success that it had dismantling Jim Crow.
This voice, however, misleads us. King’s
death did not itself throw the Movement off this
path. Instead, his assassination serves as a dispiriting marker for the moment when the Civil
Rights Movement’s internal divisions overcame
its grand moral vision—a vision that King
believed should encompass a commitment to
multiracial economic egalitarianism. King’s
death did not mark the end of the black freedom
struggle, but it surely marked a transition point.
The Movement shifted from the streets into the
legislatures, from political protest to partisan politics. While there were many gains from the shift,
it profoundly limited the Movement’s ability to
be a force for economic justice. The consequences of these limitations have become more
obvious as King’s death has receded into the past.

A Fractious Movement
At the time of his death, the focus of King’s
activism had shifted from securing the social
and political rights of African Americans to a
more catholic emphasis on combating poverty.1
He was in the midst of organizing the Poor

People’s March. He hoped the March would
replicate the success of 1963’s March for Jobs
and Freedom that brought a quarter million people to the nation’s capital in advance of
Congress’ consideration of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. King was adamant about bringing a
racially diverse group of impoverished
Americans to Washington. They would be a second Bonus Army, camping on the National Mall
and engaging in peaceful civil disobedience.
Their goal was a dramatic refashioning of the
welfare state: a guaranteed minimum income, a
statutory commitment to full employment, a
massive federal jobs program, and the elimination of urban slums through the building of half
a million units of low-income housing per year.
Thus, by 1967, when King started planning
the March, he had maneuvered one of the main
institutional manifestations of the Civil Rights
Movement, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC), into a fight explicitly
aimed at promoting, first and foremost, economic justice. This process, however, revealed
the problems with using the Movement to advocate for redistributive economic policy. King
met substantial resistance to the March from
within the Movement. Some of his colleagues
had tactical objections: the logistics would be
difficult; it was unreasonable to expect society’s most vulnerable to drop everything and
march to Washington; the public would not be
sympathetic to their demands. More fundamental, however, was the fact that many rejected the
1
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March’s purpose. They did not believe the
Movement should use civil disobedience to
convince the federal government to implement
redistributive economic policies.
Indeed, even before the end of the 1960s, there
was no single Civil Rights Movement.2 There had
always been multiple movements, with different
goals, different strategies, and different institutional
manifestations. For some, economic justice had
always been at the center of what it meant to fight
for civil rights. The 1963 March on Washington
had been, after all, a march for jobs and freedom.
Indeed, many of the early leaders of the Movement,
such as A. Philip Randolph and W.E.B. Du Bois,
believed racism was simply one manifestation of
the economic injustice endemic to unrestrained
capitalism. For this strand of the Movement, which
over the years had allied itself with Communists,
Socialists, social gospel Christians, and the leftward edge of the trade union movement, the fight
for civil rights was a critique of economic inequality that would require a refashioning of capitalism
in order to achieve justice for people of all races.3

. . . [W]hen King sought to focus the
Movement on economic inequality,
he was trying to revivify an aspect
of the Movement that many
thought to be too risky . . .
Yet from the Movement’s beginnings in the
years after the end of Reconstruction, many advocates had pursued considerably less radical
approaches to civil rights that divorced the black
freedom struggle from issues of economic inequality. Since Booker T. Washington, the Movement
had contained a powerful strand of social uplift
philosophy that emphasized the importance of presenting an image of responsibility and self-reliance
to the white majority. For many within the black
bourgeoisie, this philosophy suggested that the
correct approach to pursuing civil rights was a
heartfelt embrace of capitalism, markets, and individual economic initiative.4
Others within the Movement rooted the fight
for civil rights within a Christian moral paradigm that avoided a critique of capitalism, and
instead emphasized the moral imperative of
integration and colorblindness. This approach
was frequently linked, by King and others, to
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aspirational values of political and social (but
not economic) equality that they rooted in a
uniquely American constitutional tradition. In
postwar America, this strand of civil rights
thought sometimes manifested itself in a more
secular, scientific mode. It portrayed racism as
a psychological disorder of particular individuals who misunderstood America’s bedrock
principles, rather than a structural component
of American political economy. Indeed, in the
years after World War II, these various
approaches to civil rights—uplift, a return to
American values, racism as deviant behavior—
were particularly potent. Anticommunist political culture suggested to civil rights leaders that
grounding antiracism in religious teachings, the
American civic tradition, and “scientific”
understandings of racism as a psychological
pathology were the best ways to convince the
white majority of the justice of the cause. To
link the Movement to structural critiques of
capitalism and advocacy of progressive wealth
redistribution, on the other hand, was suicide.
Thus, when King sought to focus the Movement
on economic inequality, he was trying to revivify an aspect of the Movement that many
thought to be too risky to emphasize in the
years immediately following World War II.5
Finally, the Civil Rights Movement had always
contained a potent strand of separatist nationalism. By their very nature, nationalists clashed
with those who wished to forge interracial alliances for economic justice. Nationalism also contained within it a significant vein of pro-capitalist
ideology. To be sure, by the 1960s, some nationalist organizations invoked, with more or less sincerity, communist (or Maoist) ideas. Many
nationalists, however, dreamed of an autonomous
African-American economic order within independent black communities. While this economic
order did not look like contemporary American
industrial capitalism, it had more in common with
romantic notions of early nineteenth-century,
small-town capitalism than it had with the robust
welfare state that King advocated.6
These divisions within the Civil Rights
Movement suggest that reconstituting it as a
force focused on eliminating poverty would
have been difficult even had King lived. Indeed,
one of the many tragedies of King’s last days
was the toll these divisions took on him. His
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biographers uniformly describe him struggling
with “bouts of near incapacitating depression”7
brought on by the increasingly bitter, internecine battles within the Movement. King
attempted to shift the Movement to focus more
directly on economic inequality while maintaining his commitment to both nonviolence
and interracialism. But advocates of other goals
and tactics plagued him. Some demanded that
he endorse their priorities. Other derided him as
out of touch and over the hill. Still others did
both. The tragedy of the end of King’s life was
that he had become too powerful a symbol of
the Civil Rights Movement to be left alone to
shape it according to his own priorities.8

From the Streets to the Voting Booth
The existence of these conflicts within the Civil
Rights Movement did not mean that it ceased to
concern itself with economic issues after King’s
death. It did, but using different tactics.
Historians of the Movement characterize the
years following the assassination as ones in
which it stopped acting as a national movement
of mass protest and refocused its attention on
electoral politics.9 This shift from the streets to
the ballot box brought considerable successes,
even in a political climate that grew increasingly hostile to civil rights. Yet while this move
into conventional politics brought with it much
power, it also had profound limitations.

It was only in the 1970s . . . that
electoral politics became the
primary strategy used to further
the civil rights agenda.
Everyone within the Movement accepted the
idea that political participation was fundamental
to the black freedom struggle. Securing some
form of federal protection for voting rights was
one of its primary goals in the years following
World War II. Similarly, voter registration drives
in the South were the focus of both the SCLC and
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC). As former SNCC chairman John Lewis
said, “The bottom line was voting.”10 It was only
in the 1970s, however, that electoral politics
became the primary strategy used to further the
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civil rights agenda. Those years saw two fractious but energizing National Black Political
Conventions, as well as the founding of the
Congressional Black Caucus. These same years
saw a dramatic increase in the number of AfricanAmerican elected officials in the United States. In
1965, just before the passage of the Voting Rights
Act, there were 193 African Americans holding
political office in the United States.11 By 1976,
that number had risen to 3,979. By 1980, there
were 4,912.12 Indeed, even this enormous
increase in office-holding understates the influence of black voters. As the registration of
African Americans surged—more than doubling
in the South between 1965 and 197013—white
politicians courted their votes with increased
intensity. This was most obvious in the presidential election of 1976 in which black votes made
up Jimmy Carter’s margin of victory.14 This pattern of white politicians courting AfricanAmerican voters was replicated throughout the
country, at all levels of government.

In 1965, just before the passage of
the Voting Rights Act, there were
193 African Americans holding
political office in the United States.
. . . By 1980, there were 4,912.
The results of this new emphasis on partisan
politics were mixed. On the national level, it
succeeded in promoting issues that were part of
the traditional civil rights agenda. Jimmy Carter,
for example, appointed more African-American
federal judges (thirty-seven, or 14 percent of his
judicial appointments) than every previous president combined.15 His executive branch appointees were similarly diverse, with 12 percent
being African American, including high-profile
appointments such as the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, the Ambassador to the
United Nations, the Solicitor General, the head
of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights
Division, the Secretary of the Army, and the
Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.16 Similarly, even after the
Republicans regained control of the presidency
and the Senate in 1981, the power of black voters and politicians ensured the enactment of a
continuing stream of civil rights legislation; some
passed over President Ronald Reagan’s veto: the
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1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments, the Martin
Luther King Jr. Holiday Act of 1983, the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, and the
Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988.17
At the federal level, however, the use of the
political process was singularly unsuccessful in
expanding the civil rights agenda to include
legislation aimed at combating poverty more
generally. African-American leaders expressed
frustration and anger at Carter’s unwillingness
to embrace Keynesian economic policies
designed to reduce unemployment and increase
wages. Indeed, if there was a single piece of
legislation that tested the theory that the
Movement’s turn to electoral politics could further King’s economic agenda, it was the
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill. As
originally proposed in 1974, this legislation
would have required the federal government to
keep the unemployment rate at or below 4 percent by acting as an employer of last resort during economic downturns. Coretta Scott King
repeatedly emphasized that no legislation
would be a better tribute to her husband’s legacy. Leading a coalition of labor unions and
civil rights organizations, she lobbied hard for
the bill. In the increasingly conservative political climate of the 1970s, however, its progressive components were stripped away. Mandates
became goals. The employment program was
eliminated, portrayed as both budget-busting
and inflationary. Indeed, the final version of the
legislation passed in 1978 only after its goal of
reducing unemployment had been pushed aside
by provisions implementing distinctly unredistributive policies such as curbing inflation and
balancing the federal budget. King and her
allies claimed a victory, but detached observers
saw the bill for what it was: toothless sop to
African-American and white liberal legislators
with no realistic chance of creating jobs.
Without a mass movement behind them, these
political forces had lost the capacity to pass
truly progressive economic legislation.18
The story of the Movement’s shift to partisan
politics at the state and local level is rosier.19 This
was most evident in the South where AfricanAmerican political participation transformed the
region. The number of local African-American
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office holders increased dramatically throughout
the South during the 1970s, as did the number of
white politicians who depended on black votes
for their success. The direct material benefits to
African Americans brought about through political participation were obvious. Lily-white law
enforcement agencies were integrated. Unpaved
streets in black neighborhoods were paved, and
parks sprung up in black communities heretofore
ignored by local politicians. Public works programs were desegregated. Public sector jobs
flowed into the African-American community.
Changes in government contracting procedures,
including set asides for minority businesses,
resulted in increases in black private sector
employment as well. Thus, as politicians came to
count on African-American votes, the black
community benefitted from the traditional spoils
of the electoral process: “We Provided the Votes”
editorialized an African American newspaper in
Los Angeles, “Now We Want the Oats.”20 It may
not have been the exact sentiment that King
expressed as he sought to reorient the Movement
to fight for economic justice, but for many
African Americans, the effect was the same:
access to public services and good jobs, and
entry into the middle class.

White politicians may have become
responsive to the African-American
community, but black politicians
needed to respond to white elite
interests as well.
Even at the local level, however, the commitment to partisan politics as the primary
method of advancing civil rights had significant
limitations. Interest-group politics was a double-edged sword. White politicians may have
become responsive to the African-American
community, but black politicians needed to
respond to white elite interests as well. This fact
put significant restraints on their ability to
address fundamental issues of economic
inequality. The contrast between King’s last
campaign—to support striking sanitation workers in Memphis—and the outcome of a similar
strike in Atlanta nine years later vividly illustrate the nature of these restraints.
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A Tale of Two Strikes
The details of the Memphis strike are a familiar
part of King’s biography.21 He traveled to
Memphis in April of 1968 to organize protests on
behalf of African-American sanitation workers
demanding higher pay and an end to dehumanizing, dangerous working conditions. (The strike
began after two workers were crushed to death in
a malfunctioning trash compactor.) Although
Memphis’ mayor, Henry Loeb, is not as well
known in the annals of labor and civil rights suppression as other neolithic, southern politicians of
the era, he played the part to a T: striking workers
were met with stonewalling, red-baiting, strikebreakers, and brutal police violence.
King’s assassination ended the strike in
Memphis. Faced with violent protest throughout
the country in the aftermath of the murder, federal officials pressured Loeb into a settlement
favorable to the union. Although the cost was
terrible, King seemed to have connected the tactics of nonviolence to the fight for economic
justice in a manner that transcended race. He
had linked the traditional institutions of the
Civil Rights Movement to a labor union—the
American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME)— that itself
was at the forefront of promoting interracial
economic egalitarianism. With its progressive
leadership and a genuinely integrated membership, AFSCME seemed like the perfect partner
for a Movement that had focused its attention on
combating both racial and economic inequality.
Compare the outcome of the Memphis sanitation strike with a similar strike, nine years later
in Atlanta.22 As in Memphis, Atlanta’s AfricanAmerican sanitation workers were hideously
underpaid, their wages insufficient to bring their
families’ income above the federal poverty line.
Similarly, Atlanta’s mayor took a hardline with
the workers. While he avoided violence, he had
no qualms about firing the striking workers and
permanently replacing them with strikebreakers.
When the workers offered to end the strike in
exchange for getting their jobs back, the mayor
bluntly refused them: Their jobs no longer
existed. Those jobs belonged to the replacement
workers. The strike and the union were broken.
The most remarkable difference between the
Memphis strike and the Atlanta strike, however,
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was not the outcome. It was the union’s antagonist. While Loeb was one in a long line of
southern politicians intent on maintaining white
racial and economic hegemony, Atlanta’s
mayor was Maynard Jackson, the city’s first
African-American mayor. Furthermore, the
city’s civil rights establishment—the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), the Urban League, even the
SCLC—actively supported Jackson’s unionbusting strategy. Indeed, Jackson’s most outspoken supporter was the slain civil rights
leader’s father, Martin Luther King Sr., the
longtime minster at Atlanta’s Ebenezer Baptist
Church. Most disturbingly, the elder King
deployed rhetoric drawn from the playbook of
the Civil Rights Movement’s white supremacist
opponents. Labor unrest, King told the Atlanta
Constitution, was the result of outside agitators,
particularly the leadership of AFSCME: “If any
group comes in to try to destroy our town, we
are against it, with all the power we have.”23

. . . [In the 1977 sanitation workers’
strike] Atlanta’s . . . civil rights
establishment . . . actively supported
[Mayor Maynard] Jackson’s unionbusting strategy.
Jackson was explicit about his reasons for
breaking the strike. He felt intense pressure to
be fiscally prudent, perhaps more than a white
mayor might have. Accusing black politicians
of fiscal irresponsibility had, after all, been the
stock in trade of the white supremacist redeemers who put an end to Reconstruction and disfranchised African Americans in the late
nineteenth century. Accordingly, the image of
Atlanta’s first African-American mayor plunging the city into debt was not one that Jackson
was willing to countenance. “Before I take the
city into a deficit . . . elephants will roost in
trees.”24 Similarly, as he ran for reelection that
year, Jackson needed to appeal not only to the
African-American middle class but also to
Atlanta’s white middle class, and to the city’s
business elites. Indeed, Jackson’s alliance with
white business interests was replicated by black
mayors in most cities where they were elected.25

6
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Politics was a double-edged sword. By the
1970s, white politicians courted AfricanAmerican voters by furthering their interests.
Black politicians, in turn, had to gain the support of powerful interests within the white business community if they wished to stay in power.
The need for this sort of political pragmatism
meant that as the Movement became primarily
devoted to electoral politics, its ability to promote progressive economic policies was
severely limited.

. . . [W]hat . . . progressive
politicians, both black and white,
had discovered by the 1980s was
that “they were generals without
armies.”
Not every African-American politician made
the same compromises with elite business interests that Jackson and other African-American
big city majors did. For these black progressives, however, the shift from protests to ballots
caused a different problem: It was often hard to
pursue progressive economic policies in the
political realm without accompanying social
protest. The failure of Humphrey-Hawkins was
proof positive of this fact.26 Similar problems
emerged in states and localities. In his wonderful history of Civil Rights Movement in northern states, Sweet Land of Liberty, Thomas
Sugrue describes Roxanne Jones, an AfricanAmerican state senator from Philadelphia,
fighting to realize King’s dream of economic
egalitarian public policy.27 In office from 1985
until her death in 1996, her legislative agenda
included policies, small and large, designed to
protect Pennsylvania’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens: rehabilitation programs for
drug-addicted mothers, health care for AIDS
patients, financial assistance for the elderly,
heating aid and medical assistance for the poor.
Most of these initiatives failed. Indeed, most of
her career was spent in unsuccessful attempts to
limit the pernicious effects of Ronald Reagan’s
cuts to welfare (“human genocide,” she called
it28) and subsequent welfare “reform” legislation. Jones, who had cut her teeth in the National
Welfare Rights Organization, and had been a

participant in the Poor People’s March, was, by
nature, more of an activist than a politician. But
what she and other progressive politicians, both
black and white, had discovered by the 1980s
was that “they were generals without armies.”29
Too often, the Movement’s shift from the streets
to the ballot box left the politicians who wished
to further King’s dream of a racially and economically egalitarian society unable to mobilize the social protest that would have turned
that dream into a reality.

Making the Whispered Dream
Reality
The fifty years since King’s murder have not
been good ones for progressives engaged in the
fight for economic justice. Republican thirst for
tax cuts, welfare reform, deregulation, and
union busting have eviscerated the social safety
net. Similarly, the Democratic Party has evidenced little stomach for expanding the welfare
state, or otherwise slowing the dramatic
increase in income inequality that has occurred
since the early 1970s. None of this was caused
by King’s assassination. Nor is it the fault of the
Civil Rights Movement. An amorphous mass
movement cannot make blameworthy choices.
Historical circumstances dictated its fractious
nature, which, in turn, made it a poor candidate
to be the vanguard of a movement for combating economic inequality. Its turn to partisan
politics was similarly unconscious. Indeed,
after the remarkable success of the Voting
Rights Act, it would have been shocking if the
Movement had not gravitated toward the use of
the political power that African Americans had
previously been denied through violence, fraud,
and legal disfranchisement.
Broad social movements are by their very
nature chaotic, restless entities. They are difficult to focus on a unified goal, even by a leader
as gifted as King. Yet advocates for social justice do not have the luxury of abandoning them,
in all their messiness, for the well-worn channels of party politics. Indeed, what brought
about the Civil Rights Movement’s successes—
from Birmingham to Selma, from the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to the Voting Rights Act—
was King’s ability to blend these two forms of
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advocacy. The whispered dream—“imagine
our society, if only King had lived”—can only
be realized by doing so.
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